On August 3, 2026, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling that quietly redraws one of the oldest boundary lines in Indian criminal law: who counts as a “husband” for the purposes of prosecuting cruelty. In Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, a bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh held that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 — the provision punishing cruelty by a husband or his relatives — extends to men in live-in relationships that qualify as “relationships in the nature of marriage,” provided there was a clear, mutual intent to marry.

The ruling matters well beyond the two litigants. India has millions of couples in long-term cohabiting relationships that never culminate in a registered or ceremonially complete marriage — sometimes because one partner conceals a prior marriage, sometimes because families object, sometimes by choice. Until now, a woman in such a relationship who suffered cruelty had to rely mainly on the civil remedies under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, because Section 498A’s criminal machinery was widely read as confined to a legally wedded wife and husband. This judgment changes that calculus, while trying carefully not to throw the door open to every live-in arrangement.

Background: A Disputed Marriage and a Quashing Petition

The complainant alleged that she had married the appellant, Dr. Lokesh B.H., according to Hindu rites, and that she was thereafter subjected to cruelty, dowry-related harassment and physical injury. She lodged criminal complaints invoking Section 498A IPC along with the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The appellant’s defence was not that the relationship never existed, but that no legally valid marriage had ever been solemnised — and that, as a result, Section 498A could not apply to him at all, since the section by its terms punishes cruelty by a “husband.”

The Karnataka High Court declined to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reasoning that “husband” deserved a purposive construction that could extend to a man in a relationship carrying the essential attributes of marriage — particularly where he had held himself out to the woman and to society as her husband. Dr. Lokesh B.H. carried that challenge to the Supreme Court.

What the Supreme Court Held

“Husband” Is Not Only a Certificate

The Court rejected a narrow, certificate-bound reading of Section 498A. It reasoned that confining the word “husband” strictly to a man in a legally solemnised marriage, while denying identical protection to a woman in a marriage-like live-in relationship who has suffered the same cruelty, creates a classification that “has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence” and therefore offends the equality guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution. The purpose of Section 498A, the Court noted, is to deter cruelty inflicted from a position of domestic control and dependency — a harm that does not disappear merely because a marriage certificate is missing.

The Test: When Does a Live-In Relationship Qualify?

Crucially, the Court did not say every live-in couple is now within Section 498A’s reach. Drawing on its own precedents in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), the bench held that a “relationship in the nature of marriage” is akin to a common-law marriage, and ordinarily requires:

  • the parties holding themselves out to society as spouses,
  • both partners being of legal age and otherwise legally competent to marry,
  • voluntary cohabitation for a significant, continuous period, and
  • a shared household, with pooled finances, domestic responsibilities and public representation as a couple.

The judgment is emphatic that “merely spending weekends together or a one-night stand” would not satisfy this test, and that courts must examine the totality of circumstances — duration, public acknowledgment, shared responsibilities — rather than treat cohabitation alone as sufficient.

Intent to Marry: The Extra Ingredient for a Criminal Case

The Court added a further, calibrated requirement specific to invoking a penal provision: beyond the Velusamy/Indra Sarma indicia (which govern civil claims like maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act), a woman seeking to prosecute her live-in partner under Section 498A must also show that the relationship carried a genuine, mutual intention to marry as an intrinsic element. The Court treated this as a proportionate safeguard: since a criminal charge carries the risk of imprisonment, the threshold for extending “husband” into that context is deliberately higher than the threshold applied in civil proceedings.

Guarding Against Misuse: Arrest Safeguards Still Apply

Aware that Section 498A has long attracted allegations of misuse in matrimonial disputes — a concern the Court itself has flagged before in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand and Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar — the bench directed that the mandatory arrest safeguards under the Arnesh Kumar framework apply with equal force to live-in partners now covered by this extension: no arrest without a preliminary inquiry and recorded reasons, exactly as would apply to a legally married husband. The Court was equally careful to cabin its ruling, clarifying that this interpretive extension applies only to Section 498A and its consequences, and does not, by itself, alter how other IPC provisions — for instance those dealing with bigamy or matrimonial offences requiring a subsisting valid marriage — are to be read.

Bearing on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita

Section 498A IPC has since been reproduced, in substance, as Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the new substantive criminal code that has replaced the IPC. Commentary on the judgment has noted that because Section 85 BNS carries forward the same text and legislative object as the old Section 498A, the Supreme Court’s reasoning on “husband,” the marriage-like-relationship test and the intent-to-marry requirement should apply with equal force to prosecutions brought under the new code — meaning the ruling is not simply a footnote to a repealed provision but live law for cases registered today.

Disposition

Applying this framework to the facts, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Karnataka High Court’s refusal to quash the proceedings, permitting the trial to continue. It clarified that its observations were confined to the legal question of whether Section 498A could apply at all, and were not to be read as a finding on the truth of the underlying allegations — that determination remains for the trial court.

Conclusion: What This Means in Practice

For Indian legal professionals, this judgment supplies a workable, precedent-anchored test rather than a blanket rule — practitioners advising clients in contested-marriage or live-in disputes now have a clearer checklist of what a complaint (or a defence) needs to establish before Section 498A, or Section 85 BNS, can be invoked. For citizens, the message cuts both ways: a woman in a genuine, marriage-like relationship with demonstrated intent to marry is no longer without criminal recourse against cruelty merely because a ceremony was incomplete or contested; equally, the judgment does not expose every live-in relationship, or its end, to criminal liability. Family courts, trial courts and investigating officers will now need to apply the Velusamy/Indra Sarma indicia plus the intent-to-marry requirement as a threshold inquiry before proceeding — a fact-intensive exercise that is likely to generate further litigation over its edges in the months ahead.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does this judgment mean every live-in relationship is now covered by Section 498A?

No. The Supreme Court was explicit that mere cohabitation, a casual relationship, or a one-night stand does not qualify. The relationship must meet the “relationship in the nature of marriage” test — significant duration, shared household, public representation as spouses — and additionally show a genuine, mutual intent to marry.

What is the difference between this test and the test used for maintenance claims under the Domestic Violence Act?

The Domestic Violence Act’s civil remedies apply based on the D. Velusamy/Indra Sarma indicia alone. This judgment holds that invoking the criminal machinery of Section 498A requires an additional element — demonstrated intent to marry — because a criminal charge carries the risk of imprisonment and therefore demands a higher threshold.

Does this ruling apply to cases registered under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita instead of the IPC?

Commentators note that Section 85 BNS substantially reproduces Section 498A IPC’s text and purpose, so the Court’s reasoning is expected to apply equally to prosecutions under the new code, even though the case itself arose under the IPC.

Can the accused still be arrested immediately once a complaint is filed?

No. The Supreme Court directed that the arrest safeguards from Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar — including a preliminary inquiry and recorded reasons before arrest — apply with equal force to live-in partners now brought within Section 498A’s scope.

Does this judgment decide whether the complainant’s marriage actually took place?

No. The Supreme Court’s ruling was confined to the legal question of whether Section 498A could apply to the relationship at all. It expressly left the factual question of what actually happened between the parties to be decided at trial.

What precedents did the Court rely on for its constitutional reasoning?

The bench drew on Article 14 equality jurisprudence and referred to the personal-autonomy dimension recognised in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and the right to choose a partner recognised in Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., alongside the purposive-interpretation approach to socially beneficial legislation applied earlier in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam.

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